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Abstract In this paper, I present some popular measures of mobility in economic
outcomes within a family across generations. I also discuss two of the most impor-
tant factors preventing intergenerational mobility: existence of financially constrained
individuals and transmission of tastes from parents to children. Finally, I show how
these two factors could give raise to dramatic reversals of fortune affecting successive
generations of the same dynasty. I will cast the results of the different models I use in
terms of the previous measures of intergenerational mobility.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of intergenerational mobility refers to the study of the lack of persis-
tence in outcomes across generations within the same family. From an Economics
viewpoint, the outcomes that are subject of study range from quantitative variables
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like consumption, wealth, income or earnings, to qualitative variables like occupation
or education attainment. The degree of intergenerational mobility in these economic
variables tells us how easily families move between different parts of the associated
distribution and, thus, it has been typically used to measure equality of opportunity
within an economy.
Intergenerational mobility is a topic that has drawn the attention to economists
since its presence tends to be associated with an inefficient allocation of resources.
For instance, consider an environment where the optimal investment in education for
each individual were a function of his learning ability (or innate talent) and that the
learning ability of individuals were independent of their predecessors’ ability. In this
case, the optimal allocation of education expenditures should be incompatible with
any type of correlation in educational attainment between parents and children. The
intergenerational persistence in human capital, possibly arising from the correlation
between parental wealth and education investment or from other environmental factors
acting during the early periods of children’s life, would call for public intervention to
restore ex-ante optimality.
One of the first issues that the research on intergenerational mobility deals with
refers to its measurement. In Sect. 2, I will discuss some of the traditional tech-
niques of measurement. These techniques are based on single numerical values, like
the intergenerational correlation and the intergenerational elasticity, or provide more
exhaustive information, like the transition matrices. Finally, I will present a more
recent measure aimed at capturing upward mobility.
While some of the factors underlying the phenomenon of intergenerational per-
sistence of economic variables across the different generations of the same dynasty
are purely biological (like genetic inheritance) or cultural (like transmission of tastes,
aspirations, or neighborhood effects), others have a more economic component, like
the existence of borrowing constraints, which condemn poor families to remain poor
across generations since they cannot afford the investment in one of the more efficient
social elevators, namely, education. Section 3 reviews briefly these potential drivers
of socioeconomic immobility.
Sections 4 and 5 pay attention to two of the most popular mechanisms undermining
intergenerational mobility. The first mechanism is not necessarily connected to any
kind of inefficiency as it has to do with the way preferences of individuals are shaped
in the early periods of their lives. If children end up having the same preferences
as their parents, then they will tend to take the same economic decisions concern-
ing the consumption profile along their life cycle, occupation or attitude towards work
effort. Therefore, intergenerational persistence in consumption and earnings should be
observed as a result of this process of preference formation. The second mechanism
has however clear welfare implications since it is linked to the existence of finan-
cially constrained individuals who cannot implement their optimal decisions like, for
instance, those concerning the optimal investment in either their own or their children’s
education. For this second mechanism, I will also discuss the positive implications of
some popular policy measures aimed at remedying the immobility brought about by
financial constraints.
Section 6 analyzes the possibility of dramatic reversals of fortune within a family
and reviews some of the driving factors for this extreme form of intergenerational
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mobility. Those factors are typically associated with the conjecture formulated by the
famous steel businessman Andrew Carnegie, according to which the sons that receive
a large inheritance from their parents tend to allocate less effort to work. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 The measurement of intergenerational mobility
Let me first mention that the empirical analysis of intergenerational income mobility
has focussed on fathers and sons since the rate of female labor force participation in
most countries has been quite low in the past so that there is not enough data to draw
conclusions about the comparison between mothers and daughters. It is also important
to point out that the study of intergenerational mobility in quantitative variables should
rely on the permanent values of these variables in order to minimize potential biases
and measurement errors arising from using one year observations for both fathers and
sons. Those permanent values are obtained by averaging the observed values over
several years. Moreover, it is necessary to control for the ages of both fathers and sons
at the time those variables are measured.
One of the most comprehensive instruments to measure intergenerational mobility
for an economic variable relies on the analysis of the corresponding transition matrix
P. To construct this matrix, the values of the variable under study are divided in class
intervals or bins so that each value pi j of the cell (i, j) of the matrix P gives us the
relative conditional frequency that the value of the relevant variable for the son lies in
the bin j given that the value of the same variable for his father lies in the bin i. Thus,
a transition probability matrix with the values of all its cells concentrated around the
diagonal will be a signal of persistence (or immobility).
Let us assume first that the variable under study is quantitative, like earnings,
income,wealth, or consumption.1 We can divide the population of fathers and sons
into Q quantiles for the quantitative variable we are considering so that the value pi j is
just the relative conditional frequency that the variable for the sonwill take a value lying
in the quantile j given that the corresponding value for the father lies in the quantile
i. Just for illustrative purposes, let us consider the following three transition matrices
providing information about the degree of mobility among quintiles of earnings in the
US (Isaacs 2007), Spain (Cervini-Plá 2011) and Sweden (Jäntti et al. 2006):
Father Son
Top Fourth Middle Second Bottom
Top quintile .39 .23 .14 .15 .09
Fourth quintile .26 .32 .19 .15 .08
Middle quintile .19 .17 .23 .24 .17
Second quintile .10 .18 .24 .23 .25
Bottom quintile .06 .11 .18 .23 .42
Transition matrix of earnings: US (Source: Isaacs 2007. Data: PSID 2006)
1 Earnings are the compensations to all types of labor services including entrepreneurial labor, income
refers to earnings plus capital income and government transfers, and wealth is the value of all financial and
real assets minus the value of all debts
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Father Son
Top Fourth Middle Second Bottom
Top quintile .33 .22 .16 .16 .13
Fourth quintile .21 .23 .22 .18 .16
Middle quintile .21 .23 .20 .19 .17
Second quintile .15 .16 .23 .22 .24
Bottom quintile .10 .16 .19 .25 .30
Transition matrix of earnings: Spain (Source: Cervini-Plá 2011. Data: Encuesta de Condiciones de
Vida 2005)
Father Son
Top Fourth Middle Second Bottom
Top quintile .37 .19 .14 .14 .16
Fourth quintile .23 .22 .20 .18 .17
Middle quintile .17 .22 .22 .21 .18
Second quintile .13 .20 .24 .22 .21
Bottom quintile .11 .18 .21 .24 .26
Transition matrix of earnings: Sweden (Source: Jäntti et al. 2006. Data: Statistics Sweden’s administrative
registers, cohort born in 1962)
If we compare the previous transition matrices for the US and Sweden we see that,
while the probability that the high earnings (in the top quintile) families remain in
the same quintile are similar in both countries (39 versus 37 %), the probability of
escaping from poverty in Sweden is much higher than in the US as the probability of
remaining in the lower quintile in the US is 42 %while in Sweden it is just 26 %. Note
also that extreme movements across quintiles in Sweden are much more likely than in
the US. For instance, in Sweden the probability of moving intergenerationally from
the top quintile to the bottom quantile (extreme downward mobility) is 16 % and the
probability of moving from the bottom quantile to the top quintile (extreme upward
mobility) is 11 %. This probability is almost half in the US (9 and 6 %, respectively).
The transition matrix corresponding to Spain exhibits larger extreme mobility than in
theUS but lower than in Sweden.Moreover, Spain exhibits less persistence of earnings
in the top quintile than both the US and Sweden and intermediate persistence in the
bottom quintile. We see thus that from the transition matrices we can infer information
both about the degree of persistence in each quintile and the degree of mobility across
different quintiles.
If we would like to know which of the three previous countries exhibits more
mobility, we should summarize all the information contained in the transition matri-
ces in a single number that could be easily compared across countries. Of course,
the mapping from the set of transition matrices into the set of real numbers involves
a severe loss of information since the resulting single number cannot tell us nei-
ther whether the type of mobility is strong (across distant quantiles) or weak (across
near quantiles) nor whether the degree of persistence within each quantile is high or
low.
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Since a transition matrix is a stochastic matrix, i.e., the values of the cells in each
row must add up to one, it has an eigenvalue equal to one while its other eigenvalues
are smaller or equal to one. In order to measure the degree of mobility implicit in a
given transition matrix we need to find a measure of the ”distance” of this matrix with
respect to the identity matrix, which represents absolute immobility across quantiles.
One popular measure of intergenerational mobility is given by one minus the second
largest eigenvalue of the transition matrix. Note in this respect that the identity matrix
has all its eigenvalues equal to one and, therefore, its measure of intergenerational
mobility is equal to zero. Moreover, a Q × Q matrix whose cell values are all equal to
1/Q , which is an environment sometimes described as ”complete mobility”, has an
eigenvalue equal to one and all the other eigenvalues equal to zero so that itsmeasure of
intergenerationalmobility is equal to 1. Thevalues for thismeasure of intergenerational
mobility associatedwith the above transitionmatrices for the earnings in theUS, Spain
and Sweden are 0.606, 0.773, and 0.780, respectively, which confirms the highest
degree of intergenerational earnings mobility in Sweden and the intermediate position
of Spain among these three countries. It is worth mentioning that these numbers
challenge the idea of “American exceptionalism”, a term that referred to the supposed
exceptionally high rates of social mobility in the US.
In the same spirit of the previous real valued measure, the literature on intergener-





j=1 |i − j | pi j
Q
,
which is the sum of the transition probabilities weighted by the jump in the number
of quantiles between fathers and sons. The identity matrix has an AQM equal to zero
as in this case pii = 1 and pi j = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , Q and i = j. Note that the
AQM discriminates between strong (across distant quantiles) or weak (across near
quantiles) mobility.
Similarly, the normalized trace index (Shorrocks 1978),
NT I = Q − trace(P)
Q − 1 ,
is another measure of the distance from the identity matrix. The NT I is equal to zero
for the identity matrix and is equal to one for a matrix displaying ”complete mobility”.
Transition matrices can also be constructed for qualitative variables or attributes,
like occupation type, working sector, or education level. In this case, the different
bins are constructed just taking into account the different qualitative values of the
variable and not the frequency of individuals lying in each bin. Therefore, in this case
we cannot guarantee that the different classes have exactly the same size for each
generation. Let us illustrate this type of transition matrices with the following matrix
providing information about the degree of intergenerational mobility in education
attainment in Spain (Cervini-Plá 2011):
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Father Son
5 4 3 2 1 0
5 .78 .01 .16 .04 .01 .00
4 .44 .12 .36 .08 .00 .00
3 .57 .01 .31 .07 .03 .00
2 .41 .02 .34 .18 .05 .00
1 .35 .02 .25 .24 .14 .00
0 .11 .02 .18 .35 .34 .00
0: Did not finish primary education, 1: Primary education, 2: Secondary education (first step),
3: Secondary education (second step), 4: Vocational qualification, 5: Higher education (university).
Transitionmatrix of education attainment: Spain (Source: Cervini-Plá 2011. Data: Encuesta de Condiciones
de Vida 2005)
We can infer from the previous transition matrix the large degree of persistence of
the high levels of education in Spain since the conditional probability that a son has a
college degree given that his father also has it is 78 %. Similarly, the following matrix
provides information about intergenerational mobility across types of occupation in
the US (Long and Ferrie 2013):
Father Son
H W C L W C F S/Semi. Unsk.
High White Collar .62 .12 .00 .21 .05
Low White Collar .50 .16 .00 .26 .08
Farmer .24 .08 .13 .43 .12
Skilled/Semiskilled .33 .11 .01 .46 .09
Unskilled .25 .10 .01 .51 .13
“High White Collar”: professional, technical, and kindred; managers, officials, and proprietors.
“Low White Collar”: clerical and sales. “Farmer”: farm owners and farm managers.
“Skilled/Semiskilled”: craftsmen and operatives. “Unskilled”: service workers and laborers, including farm
laborers.
Transition probabilities of occupations US. (Source: Long and Ferrie 2013)
Note that the previous two matrices do not contain information about the fraction
of individuals (either fathers or sons) in a given bin. However, if the previous matrices
where time independent, we could easily compute its associated ergodic stochastic
probability vector, which is the vector of frequencies in the long run of the different
bins, which turns out to be independent of the initial distribution of frequencies. For
instance, from the previous transition matrix of occupations in the USwe can compute
the following distribution of the five types of occupation in the long run:
H W C L W C F S/Semi. Unsk.
.49 .12 .00 .32 .07
We see thus that in the long run the class of farmers will have a negligible weight in
the total working population of the US, while almost half of the population will be
composed of highly skilled workers.
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I should also mention that, since the frequencies of individuals in the different bins
are not equal in thematrices for qualitative variables, if there are bins that are associated
with unfavorable outcomes like, for instance, the bin composed of unskilled or poor
individuals, policymakers should implement policies aimed at reducing the fraction of
individuals belonging to this bin in the long run. Those policies could take the form of
universal provision of public education so as to remove the borrowing constraints that
prevent the investment in skill acquisition, tax reforms, or other programs of financial
aid.
There are other real-valued measures of intergenerational mobility that do not need
the previous construction of transition matrices. The most popular of them is based on
the intergenerational correlation (IC), which is simply the coefficient of correlation
between the variable xc under study for the sons and the same variable xp for the
corresponding father. Thus, since this value of the correlation coefficient is a measure
of intergenerational persistence or immobility, then 1 − IC is a natural measure of
intergenerational mobility.
The IC is closely related with another popular real-valued measure of persistence,
namely, the intergenerational elasticity (I E). The I E is just the estimate of the coef-
ficient β in the following regression:
x̂c = β x̂ p + ε,
where x̂c refers to the log-deviation from its mean of the variable under study for
the sons and x̂ p refers to the log-deviation from its mean of the variable for the
corresponding father, and ε is the typical perturbation term. Note that the I E gives
the expected elasticity of the variable xc with respect to xp. Obviously, the higher is
the value of β, the higher will be the dependence of a son’s status from his father’s
status. Thus, 1 − I E is a natural measure of intergenerational mobility. Moreover,
if the distributions of the variables x̂c and x̂ p have the same variance then the I E
coincides with the coefficient of correlation between x̂c and x̂ p. However, if these two
variables have different variances, then the relationship between the intergenerational







where σĉ and σĉ are the standard deviations of the variables x̂c and x̂ p, respectively.
Note that these two measures of intergenerational mobility can only be used for quan-
titative variables.
Several studies, like those of Mazumder (2005), Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007),
Blanden et al. (2004), Cervini-Plá (2015) have estimated the I E of earnings for several
countries and their results give values of the I E between 0.5 and 0.6 for the US, 0.3
for UK, 0.43 for Spain and 0.25 for Nordic countries. This agrees with the information
provided with the previous transition probability matrices of earnings, according to
which the degree of mobility of earning in the US is smaller (i.e., the I E is larger)
than in Europe. However, as I have already pointed out, the transition matrices provide
a more detailed information, which for example allow us to attribute the lower I E of
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Sweden relative to the US mainly to its higher probability of escaping from the lower
quintile of earnings.
Hertz et al. (2008) provided estimates of the IC of education attainment measured
by the years of schooling of each individual. The SouthAmerican countries with an IC
of around 0.6 are the ones that exhibit more persistence, which is usually attributed to
the existence of pervasive borrowing constraints to finance children’s education. The
countries ofWestern Europe exhibit an average IC of years of schooling of 0.4, which
is even lower for Nordic countries. Those lower values tend to be associated with the
strength of the welfare state. Finally, let us mention that the years of schooling in the
US display an intergenerational correlation of 0.46.
The interested reader can consult the survey of Jäntti and Jenkins (2015), which
presents the previous and other measures of intergenerational mobility. Moreover, the
survey of Black and Devereux (2011) contains a detailed discussion of the estimation
issues concerning the I E .
Note that the I E , the IC , and the transition matrices for quantitative variables
grouped in quantiles treat downward and upward intergenerational mobility symmet-
rically. However, policy makers should mainly care about providing the incentives
to promote upward mobility among the poor families. Chetty et al. (2014), using the
rank-rank specification of Dahl and DeLeire (2008), propose an appealing measure of
upward intergenerational income mobility. They rank children based on their incomes
relative to other children in the same cohort. Similarly, they rank parents of these chil-
dren based on their incomes relative to other parents. Then, they characterize mobility
using the slope of the rank-rank regression between parents and children, which gives
the correlation between children’s and parents’ positions in the overall distribution of
income. Obviously, the value of the slope of this regression will be negatively asso-
ciated with the degree of mobility in the economy. A zero value for the slope of the
rank-rank regression means that there is complete intergenerational mobility since the
expected rank of the sons does not depend on the rank of their parents. Conversely,
a unitary slope is a signal of complete immobility since the expected rank of the son
coincides with the rank of his parent. These authors find an almost perfect linear rela-
tionship between parent ranks and child ranks in the US and that a 10 percentile point
increase in parent rank corresponds on average to a 3.41 percentile point increase in
the income rank of a child.
Chetty et al. replicate their analysis for different commuting zones in the US.
They calculate for each zone the conditional expectation of the rank of children given
that their parents are at the 25 % percentile in the national income distribution of
parents so that they are relatively poor parents. This conditional expectation r25 is
clearly a measure of upward mobility. Figure 1 shows the rank-rank relationship for
the commuting zones of San Francisco and Chicago and we can infer immediately
from them that San Francisco exhibits higher mobility since the slope of its regres-
sion line is smaller than for Chicago. Moreover, upward mobility is also higher in
San Francisco since the expected rank of a son of a parent that was at the 25 %
percentile is 44.4 % while in Chicago it is 39.4 %. These authors find that upward
mobility, measured by the conditional expected rank r25, ranges from 46.2 % in
Salt Lake City to 35.8 % in Charlotte within the 50 largest commuting zones in the
US.
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Fig. 1 Rank-rank regression in San Francisco and Chicago. (Source: Chetty et al. 2014)
3 Intergenerational mobility and other economic characteristics
Once we have the instruments to measure intergenerational mobility, the natural issue
that arises is searching for the relevant factors driving intergenerational persistence of
economic outcomes or, at least, finding other economic features that tend to be empir-
ically associated with intergenerational persistence. Among the factors explaining
persistence in earnings we can consider genetic factors, which amounts to assume that
some individual characteristics (like IQ or a specific innate ability) are automatically
transmitted from parents to children. Moreover, genetic transmission is strengthened
under assortative mating, that is, when people choose to mate with persons similar to
themselves. The importance of genetics has been empirically explored by Mazumder
(2008) to find correlations in log earnings for brothers of 0.4 in the US, while Raaum
et al. (2006) found a correlation of 0.2 for Norway. We see again that the presence of
a strong welfare state tends to reduce the importance of genetic factors. Needless to
say, the previous sibling correlations can arise not only because of genetic reasons but
because of other common background variables like the neighborhood. In this respect,
Page and Solon (2003) find earnings correlations among neighbors of 0.16. In order to
disentangle sibling and neighbor correlations, Sacerdote (2007) restricts the analysis
to adoptees, which are assumed to be randomly assigned to families without inheriting
any genetic characteristic. Finally, in order to delve further into the importance of pure
genetics, some authors like Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004) and Bingley et al. (2009)
focused their attention to the analysis of earning correlations between twins.
Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) have developed very relevant theoretical models
of intergenerational earnings mobility where genetic transmission of abilities plays a
key role. They assumed that children’s earnings are correlated with their parents’ both
via the genetic inheritability of abilities and via spending on education by altruistic
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Fig. 2 The “Great Gatsby” curve. (Source: Corak 2013. Data: World Bank)
parents. Thus, children’s innate abilities are correlated, but not perfectly, with those
of their parents and the total labor compensation to each worker will be an increasing
function of his human capital, which is in turn an increasing function of ability and
investment in education. One implication of the fact that abilities are enhanced by
parents’ investments in their children’s education is that both inherited abilities and
earnings regress toward the mean but, because of the effect of parental investment in
children, earnings are more intergenerationally persistent than genetically inherited
abilities.
The aforementioned paper of Chetty et al. (2014) explores the correlation between
upward mobility and observable characteristics of the different commuting zones in
the US. They find that racial shares are empirically related to upward mobility since
it is lower (even for white individuals) in zones with a larger fraction of African
Americans. Other factors negatively related with upward mobility are residential race
segregation, indicators of bad quality of the school system, and weak family struc-
tures measured by the fraction of single parents in the area. Finally, they report a
negative relation between upward mobility and inequality measured by the Gini coef-
ficient. Let us mention incidentally in this respect that the positive (negative) relation
between intergenerational earnings persistence (mobility) and inequality also holds
across countries (see Corak 2013). Figure 2 shows the relationship between the I E
and the Gini coefficient of different countries, which is known as the “Great Gatsby”
curve.
Concerning the standard economic factors explaining persistence in earnings, the
economic literature has considered several. One of the most important refers to the
presence of financial constraints as they constitute a barrier to the acquisition of human
capital either when the investment in education is made by parents or by the same
potential students (see Solon 2004, among many others). Therefore, poor parents who
are financially constrained cannot borrow to finance the education of their children and
this results in a strong persistence of the socioeconomic status within the family across
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generations. The existence of a powerful welfare state that facilitates the acquisition of
human capital by means, for instance, of public provision of education results in larger
intergenerational earnings mobility (Ichino et al. 2011). The presence of these credit
constraints has clear normative implications. If these constraints are absent, parents
can borrow from their offspring’s future earnings and each family will optimally invest
in the human capital of their children. If both innate ability and education raise the
amount of workers’ human capital (or skill), then it will be optimal to invest more in
high ability children under some natural assumptions (Grawe and Mulligan 2002).2
This optimal allocation of the investment in education will be distorted by the presence
of financially constrained individuals and this will result in turn in a loss of aggregate
output and a lower growth rate for the economy.
Borrowing constraints could also result in “poverty traps” as the members of poor
families could end up remaining poor across generations. Since earnings are increasing
in the amount of human capital of workers, poor individuals would never be able to
obtain enough income to invest in education and, in this way, to raise their future
income (Durlauf 1996; Galor and Moav 2004, 2006; Galor and Zeira 1993; Zilcha
2003). The situation depicted in this literature is summarized in the following transition
matrix involving rich and poor individuals, where each of these types can be either
skilled or unskilled.
Father Son
R-S P-S R-U P-U
Rich-Skilled a b 1 − a − b 0
Poor-Skilled c d 1 − c − d 0
Rich-Unskilled e f 1 − e − f 0
Poor-Unskilled 0 0 0 1
Transition matrix exhibiting poverty traps for the poor unskilled
We see from the previous matrix that being a poor unskilled individual is an absorbing
state. As I have already argued, the role of public policy is thus to create conditions
to allow poor unskilled individuals to escape from that poverty trap through subsidies
to education, public provision of education, or any other policy that decreases the
long-run relative frequency of the social class of these individuals.
Owen and Weil (1998) constructed a very elegant model relating growth, income
inequality, and mobility where individuals face borrowing constraints to invest in their
children’s education. Moreover, they assume that ability is randomly distributed in the
population independently of parents’ ability so that there is no transmission of abilities
through genes. Finally, skilled and unskilled labor are assumed to be complements in
the production function. In this economy, as income grows all individuals face a less
2 Assume that the stock of individual human capital h is an increasing function of the amounts of both innate
ability a and education investment e, h(a, e). Then, a larger investment in high ability children is optimal
if the function h is concave in education investment e and the cross derivative ∂2h / ∂a ∂e is positive. Note
that the last assumption simply means that ability increases the marginal productivity of education in the
technology of human capital formation.
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binding borrowing constraint, which in turn results in a better allocation of resources
and, thus, in higher income per capita.
Another interesting feature of the economy considered by Owen and Weil is that
it might exhibit multiplicity of equilibria. Due to the assumed complementarity of
educated and uneducated workers, an economy with high levels of human capital
will have high relative wages for uneducated workers so that it would be more likely
that the children of uneducated workers will be able to afford the education cost.
Downward mobility is also more likely in this developed economy since the smaller
wage gap decreases the incentive for children of educatedworkers to become educated.
However, in an economy with low levels of education, the wage gap between educated
and uneducated workers will be larger, and this will reduce the number of children
of uneducated workers who get educated and increase the incentive for children of
educated parents to remain in the class of educated workers. Hence, mobility between
the two classes will be low. Therefore, the model generates a positive relationship
between economic development and the degree of intergenerational mobility.
Another factor explaining earnings correlation is of psychological nature as parents
could transmit their tastes and attitudes to their children so that they would end up
taking the same economic decision as an adult (Mayer et al. 2004). Moreover, the
standards of living of parents tend to be imitated by their direct descendants so that
children develop aspirations, which affect positively the income correlation across
generations (De la Croix and Michel 1999; Cox et al. 2004).
Finally, I would like to mention an issue related to intergenerational mobility,
namely, the possibility of “reversals of fortune”. This situation occurs when the transi-
tionmatrix displays a value in eachof its diagonal cells that is lower than0.5. Therefore,
in this case individuals belonging to the same dynasty will tend to change their status
across generations. As we will see later on, it is possible to generate extreme oscil-
lations of income across generations by taking into account the interaction between
wealth and effort along the lines of the Carnegie conjecture. According to this conjec-
ture, richer individuals tend to exert less effort in their occupations, which may result
in turn in sudden falls in family wealth.
In the next three sections I am going to discuss in more detail three mechanisms
driving the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status: borrowing con-
straints preventing purchases of human capital through education, transmission of
tastes through aspiration formation, and the interaction between wealth and effort so
as to generate reversals of family fortune.
4 Borrowing constraints and investment in human capital
Borrowing constraintsmake the long-run joint distribution of both human and physical
capital in the economy dependent on the initial distribution of these two types of capital
across individuals. As I have already pointed out, those constraints could give raise to
the perpetuation of poverty of a family and, hence, they are an obvious impediment for
intergenerational mobility. Let us consider a simple non-stochastic model following
the lines of Alonso-Carrera et al. (2012) to illustrate the enhanced history dependence
brought about by borrowing constraints.
123
SERIEs (2016) 7:393–420 405
Fig. 3 Transfers within a family. (Source: Alonso-Carrera et al. 2012)
The economy I consider is populated by families whose members live for three
periods. In the first period they can acquire human capital but this decision is taken by
their parents through education expenditures. In the second period they work using the
human capital acquired in the previous period and in the third period they are retired.
The model has two main features borrowed from Galor and Zeira (1993) and many
other authors: (i) the investment in human capital is indivisible, i.e., there is aminimum
amount of investment in education and (ii) the capital market is imperfect due to the
presence of borrowing constraints so that those individuals with a wealth level below
some threshold can not afford the cost of education. Therefore, the initial distribution
of wealth will determine the number of individuals that can acquire education and,
thus, the aggregate stock of human capital in the next period. Let us assume that
intergenerational transfers can take two forms: transfers of physical capital by means
of bequests and transfers of human capital by means of the parents’ investment in
the education of their children. Generations are indexed by the period in which their
members work (second period of life). Figure 3 summarizes the timing of transfers
within a dynasty.
A generic individual belonging to the dynasty (or family) i and working in period
t derives utility both from her consumption cit when she works (second period of
her life), her consumption xit+1 when she is retired (third period of her life) and her
contribution I it+1 to the lifetime income of her children (as in Becker and Tomes 1986).
The preferences of an individual belonging to dynasty i and to generation (adult in
period) t are represented by the following logarithmic utility function:
Uit = ln cit + β ln xit+1 + ρ ln I it+1, with β > 0 and ρ > 0,
where
I it+1 = wit+1 + bit+1,
andw is the exogenous wage per unit of human capital, bit+1 is the amount of physical
bequest left to each descendant and it+1 is the increase in the units of human capital
resulting from the investment made in the education of her offspring. I assume that
the number of children per individual is exogenous and equal to n > 0.
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The level of human capital at period t + 1 of an adult individual of dynasty i is
given by




0 if eit < μ
ε if eit ≥ μ,
where eit is the amount invested in education, ε > 0 is the education premiummeasured
in units of human capital, and μ > 0 is the fixed cost of education. Obviously, the
optimal investment in education for the individuals who want to have children with
hit+1 = 1 is eit = 0, whereas those individuals that want educated children (with
hit+1 = 1 + ε ) will choose eit = μ.
The budget constraint faced by an adult individual of dynasty i in period t is
wt h
i
t + bit = cit + sit + neit ,
and the budget constraint of an old individual of dynasty i in period t + 1 will be
Rsit = xit+1 + nbit+1,
where R is the exogenous gross return on capital. Finally, I also impose the constraint
that parents cannot force their children to give them gifts when the parents are old as
there are neither contracts nor institutions to enforce reverse transfers,
bit+1 ≥ 0.
Note that negative voluntary bequestswill never arise in equilibriumgiven our assump-
tion of one-sided (from parents to children) altruism.
The bequest left to each of her descendants by an old individual belonging to family
i in period t + 1 will depend on the inheritance bit she has received, her level hit of
human capital and the investment eit in education she has made in their children when
she was a worker,
bit+1 ≡ B(bit , hit , eit ).
If bit+1 > 0 , then it can be proved that this bequest function is given by the following
linear function
bit+1 ≡ B(bit , hit , eit ) =
[
βR
n (1 + β + ρ)
] (





1 + β + ρ
]
wit+1.
I am also going to impose the condition that education is always profitable,
wε ≥ μR. (1)
This condition simply states that the future increase in labor earnings of children due to
the investment in education is larger than the capitalized cost of education. Obviously
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if condition (1) holds, individuals will invest in the education of their offspring if
they can afford the minimum cost μ of education. Note that a positive investment in
education for individuals with low levels of wealth could imply a negative amount of
bequest, which is a situation that I have already ruled out by assumption. Therefore,
in this case, the individuals will not invest in the education of their children even if
the profitability condition (1) holds. The dynamics of human capital within a dynasty
is given by the following dynamic equation:
hit+1 =
{
1 if either hit = 1 and 0 ≤ bit < b˜0 or hit = 1 + ε and 0 ≤ bit < b̂0,
1 + ε if either hit = 1 and bit ≥ b˜0 or hit = 1 + ε and bit ≥ b̂0.
(2)





0 if either hit = 1 and b˜0 ≤ bit < b˜1 or hit = 1 + ε and b̂0 ≤ bit < b̂1,
B1(bit ) if h
i
t = 1 and 0 ≤ bit < b˜0,
B2(bit ) if h
i
t = 1 and bit > b˜1,
B3(bit ) if h
i
t = 1 + ε and 0 ≤ bit < b̂0,
B4(bit ) if h
i
t = 1 + ε and bit > b̂1,
where B1(bit ) ≡ B
(
bit , 1, 0
)
, B2(bit ) ≡ B
(
bit , 1, μ
)
, B3(bit ) ≡ B
(
bit , 1 + ε, 0
)
, and
B4(bit ) ≡ B
(
bit , 1 + ε, μ
)
. The threshold levels b˜0, b̂0, b˜1, b̂1 appearing in the pre-
vious dynamic equations depend on the parameters of the model and satisfy b˜ j > b̂ j ,
j = 0, 1. Therefore, the function (2) tells us that poor individuals cannot invest in the
education of their children so that their descendants will have a human capital level
equal to 1, while rich individuals will endow their children with a level of capital equal
to 1+ ε. The threshold level of inherited wealth above which the investment in educa-
tion takes place is obviously higher for the unskilled parents than for the skilled ones
since skilled parents will enjoy higher labor earnings. Under some plausible assump-
tions concerning the return on capital R, the wage per efficiency unit w, the school
premium ε and the cost of education μ, the situation depicted in Fig. 4 concerning the
bequest functions arises.3
We see from Fig. 4 that the initial distribution of bequests and human capital deter-
mines both the wealth distribution in the long run and the degree of intergenerational
mobility in human capital. Families with an initial low level of human capital, hi0 = 1,
will converge: (i) to the steady state with hi = 1 and bi = b1 if bi0 < b˜0; and (ii)
to the steady state hi = 1 + ε and bi = b2 if bi0 > b˜0. Families with an initial high
level of human capital hi0 = 1+ ε will always converge to the steady state hi = 1+ ε
and bi = b2. Therefore only the non-educated families may experience upward inter-
generational mobility. In particular, the families with an initial level of human capital
3 These assumptions generate an equilibrium where transfers of human capital and physical wealth are
positively related so that rich parents leave simultaneously large bequests and have educated offspring,
which is consistent with the empirical evidence (Nordblom and Ohlsson 2011).
123
408 SERIEs (2016) 7:393–420
Fig. 4 The dynamics of bequests within a dynasty. (Source: Alonso-Carrera et al. 2012)
hi0 = 1 educate their children if bi0 > b˜0, and then they will remain as educated fami-
lies forever. Note that the threshold amount of bequest b˜0 contains all the information
about the determinants of this one-shot upward mobility. The situation that emerges
in this economy can be summarized in the following long-run transition matrix:
Father Son
R-S P-S R-U P-U
Rich-Skilled 1 0 0 0
Poor-Skilled 1 0 0 0
Rich-Unskilled 1 0 0 0
Poor-Unskilled 0 0 0 1
Transition matrix in the long-run
Therefore, families whose members at a given period are rich skilled, poor skilled
or rich unskilled will eventually converge to the class of rich skilled. However, the
poor unskilled families will keep their socioeconomic status forever. Thus, unskilled
families with initial inherited wealth below the threshold b˜0 are the ones that face a
poverty trap. Fiscal policy can thus affect the proportion of families that converge to
each of the two steady states by distorting the intergenerational mobility in human
capital through a variation in the threshold value b˜0.
Let us consider a marginal change in a particular instrument of fiscal policy that
directly affects the equilibrium amount of bequests, namely, inheritance taxation. Let
us assume that the amount of inheritance an individual receives is now taxed and
the revenues are devoted to useless government consumption. Obviously, the mar-
ginal introduction of inheritance taxes will make physical bequests more costly as
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Fig. 5 The effect on the distribution of bequests of a marginal rise in the inheritance tax. (Source: Alonso-
Carrera et al. 2012)
an instrument to increase the lifetime income of children so that the inheritance tax
reduces the amount of bequest that parents leave to their offspring. Furthermore, this
new tax raises the amount of pre-tax inheritance that an individual must receive from
his parents in order to be willing to invest in the education of their children. Therefore,
a marginal increase in the inheritance tax ends up being an impediment for upward
mobility as the reduction in initial wealth prevents a larger fraction of individuals
from jumping the hurdle associated with the indivisible cost of education. Figure 5
depicts the change in the relative long-run frequencies of the two steady states of the
economy after introducing a tax on inheritance. These two steady states are the one
of rich-skilled individuals (with an equilibrium amount of bequest equal to b
2
) and
the one of poor-unskilled individuals (with an equilibrium amount of bequest equal to
b
1
). The marginal introduction of inheritance taxation reduces the amount of bequest
for both skilled and unskilled individuals and lowers the relative frequency of skilled
individuals.
Another natural policy in this economic environment is themarginal introduction of
an education subsidy, which directly distorts the decision of investing in education. As
before, this subsidy will be financed by the corresponding adjustments in the amount
of government consumption. The subsidy on education lowers the cost of education
faced by individuals and thus reduces the amount of inheritance that they must receive
to pay for the cost of education of their children. This will decrease the fraction of
individuals who cannot afford the cost of education. However, the steady-state level of
bequest b
2
left by each rich educated individual will go up since she will benefit from
the subsidy, whereas the level of bequests b
1
left by non-educated (i.e., the poorest)
individuals will not change since they do not invest in education and thus they are not
entitled to benefit from the subsidy. Therefore, the resulting situation involves a larger
gap between the wealth of rich and poor individuals as a consequence of the marginal
introduction of this education subsidy. Figure 6 shows the corresponding change in
the histogram of long-run frequencies.
Thepreviousmodel has shown that not only the initial distributionofwealth, but also
the distribution of the composition of wealth between bequests (i.e., initial physical
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Fig. 6 The effect on the distribution of bequests of a marginal increase in the education subsidy. (Source:
Alonso-Carrera et al. 2012)
wealth) and human capital, are important to characterize the degree of intergenera-
tional mobility in socioeconomic status. Moreover, the previous model suggests that
differences in intergenerational mobility across countries could be explained by dif-
ferences in the initial distribution and composition of wealth, in the fiscal policy set by
the governments, in the degree of imperfection of the credit market and in education
cost.
5 Transmission of tastes and wealth persistence
In this section I will show through a simple model based on Caballé and Moro-Egido
(2014) how the introduction of intergenerational transmission of preferences affects
dynastic mobility in the values of relevant economic variables. The simplest way
of generating intergenerational transmission of tastes is through the introduction of
aspirations, that is, by assuming that an individual’s utility depends on a comparison
between his current amount of consumption and that of his parents. In other words,
the amount of consumption of parents determines the standard of living with respect
which current own consumption is compared to.
Let us consider an overlapping generations framework like that of the previous
section, where individuals live for three period but only make economic decisions in
the last two period of their life. Here, in the first period individualswill only observe the
level of consumption of their parents, who are in the second period of their lives. The
individual i belonging to the generation t derives utility from the aspiration adjusted
adult consumption cˆit , old consumption x
i
t+1 and the amount bit+1 of bequests left to
each direct descendant. I am thus assuming a motive for bequest based on “joy-of-
giving” or “warm-glow altruism” like in Yaari (1965) and Abel (1986). The utility
function is assumed to have the following functional form:
U (cˆit , x
i












, with β > 0 and ρ > 0.
The inherited aspiration of an individual i of generation t is ait = cit−1, where cit−1 is
his parent’s amount of consumption when the parent was an adult (second period of
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life). I assume an additive specification for the aspiration adjusted consumption cˆit of
an adult individual i in period t :
cˆit = cit − γ ait = cit − γ cit−1, with γ ∈ [0, 1) ,
which means that, for the same level of consumption cit of an individual i, the util-
ity decreases with the level of consumption of his parent since this means that the
individual has developed greater aspirations. Moreover, this specification implies that
the marginal utility of aspiration adjusted consumption is increasing in the amount
of aspirations (i.e., of parental consumption). I assume a constant interest factor R
and idiosyncratic productivity shocks on labor that make wages wit identically and
independently distributed (i.i.d.) across individuals and across time. The expectation
and the variance of wages are assumed to be equal to w and σ 2, respectively, for
all individuals and periods. Finally, I assume that this shock in labor income is not
insurable. The budget constraints faced by the individual i who is adult (worker) in
period t are
wit + bit = cit + sit ,
and
Rsit = xit+1 + nbit+1,
where sit is the amount of saving and n is the number of children per parent.
The solution to the previous individual problem delivers the following linear








































1 + β + ρ , B =
δ (β + ρ)
1 + β + ρ ,
C = βR
1 + β + ρ , D =
δRβ
1 + β + ρ ,
E = ρR
n (1 + β + ρ) , F =
δρR
n (1 + β + ρ) ,
G = β + ρ
1 + β + ρ .
From the system formed by Eqs. (3) and (4) and, assuming that there is a continuum
of dynasties with unitary mass and that the strong law of large numbers holds in
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this economy, I can compute the equations that drive the evolution of the different
empirical moments of the joint distribution of the amount ct of adult consumption
and the amount bt+1 of bequests left by the generation that is adult in period t. In
particular, the following two difference equations, which are obtained by just taking
expectations on both sides of Eqs. (3) and (4), characterize the evolution of average
young consumption c¯t and average bequest b¯t+1,
c¯t = Bc¯t−1 + Ab¯t + Aw¯ (6)
and
b¯t+1 = −Fc¯t−1 + Eb¯t + Ew¯. (7)
Note that from the evolution of the averages c¯t and b¯t+1 we can obtain the dynamics
of average savings s¯t by just using (5),
s¯t = −Bc¯t−1 + Gb¯t + Gw¯.
Similarly, computing the variances in both sides of (3) and (4) and the covariance
between these two equations, we get the following three difference equations driving
the dynamic evolution of the empirical variances of adult consumption, Var (ct ) , and
bequests, Var (bt+1) , and the covarianceCov (ct , bt+1) between these two variables:
Var (ct ) = B2Var (ct−1) + A2Var (bt ) + 2AB Cov (ct−1, bt ) + A2σ 2, (8)
Var (bt+1) = F2Var (ct−1) + E2Var (bt ) − 2EF Cov (ct−1, bt ) + E2σ 2, (9)
and
Cov (ct , bt+1) = −BF Var (ct−1) + AE Var (bt )
+ (BE − AF) Cov (ct−1, bt ) + AE σ 2. (10)
Again, the dynamics of the variance of saving is obtained from the previous second
moments since (5) implies the following relationship:
Var (st ) = G2Var (bt ) + B2Var (ct−1) − 2BG Cov (ct−1, bt ) + G2σ. (11)
The previous expressions make explicit how the first two empirical moments of
consumption and bequests of a given cohort affect the empirical moments of the
following cohort. In order to obtain monotonic convergence both for the first moments
of the distribution, which are governed by the system of difference Eqs. (6) and (7),
and for the second moments, which are governed by the system of difference Eqs.
(8), (9), and (10), we need to impose standard stability assumptions found in capital
accumulation models, namely, that the bequest motive ρ is sufficiently low and the
gross rate n of population growth is sufficiently high so as to prevent per capita bequests
to grow without bound. Moreover, we also need to assume that the aspiration intensity
δ is sufficiently low. If δ is very large then the economy could exhibit cycles (see De la
Croix and Michel 1999). To understand the emergence of cycles for large aspiration
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intensities consider a non-stochastic environment and a generation that consumes a lot
due to an aspirationalmotive (i.e., to achieve the same standard of living of their parents
when adult). This will result in a reduction in the amount left as bequests, which in
turn will reduce the life-time income and thus the consumption of the next generation.
Therefore, intergenerational oscillations of consumption will naturally arise.
I can perform now the analysis of the effects of aspirations on the degree of inter-
generational mobility in this economy. I can studymobility in consumption at different
ages, bequests or savings but I am going to focus my analysis just on mobility in sav-
ings (or wealth), that is, in the amount of asset holdings accumulated by individuals
before entering into retirement.
The amount of savings sit+1 of the direct descendent of an individual i belonging
to generation t is
sit+1 = Gwit+1 + Gbit+1 − Bcit
= Gwit+1 + G
(











as follows from (3), (4), and (5). We see that the intergenerational transmission of
wealth arises from two channels: bequests bit+1 and parental consumption cit . More-
over, the saving of the parent of this individual is given by (5). Therefore, making
use of the strong law of large numbers and the stability assumption, we can measure
the degree of mobility in the long-run by using the steady-state value of the intergen-
erational correlation IC of asset holdings between two successive generations as in


















where the variables with prime refer to next period variables. As we saw in Sect. 2,
the higher is the value of IC, the lower is the degree of intergenerational wealth
mobility. Note that with no bequests and no aspirations there is complete mobility,
IC = 0, as the fluctuation of savings will be driven exclusively by the i.i.d. process of
wages. Conversely, if we had perfect correlation of asset holdings, i.e., IC = 1, then
intergenerational wealth mobility would be null.
Using (5) and (12)we can easily compute the covariance between savings of parents
and sons,










H = EG − AB, and I = B2 + FG.
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Therefore, using the strong law of large numbers, we can compute the empirical serial
covariance of wealth,
Cov(st+1, st ) = GH
(
σ 2 + Var(bt )
)
+BI Var(ct−1)−(BH+GI ) Cov (ct−1, bt ) ,
and the corresponding steady-state value of this covariance is thus
Cov(s′, s) = GH
(
σ 2 + Var(b)
)
+ BI Var(c) − (BH + GI ) Cov (c, b′) ,




are the steady-state second moments of the
distribution of adult consumption and bequest, which under the stability assumptions
I have made, coincide with their long-run values. Similarly, from (11) we get the
steady-state variance of saving
Var (s) = G2Var (b) + B2Var (c) − 2BG Cov (c, b′) + G2σ.
Therefore, we have all the elements needed to compute the long-run intergenerational
wealth correlation given in (13).
The parameter δ measuring the intensity of aspirations enters in the coefficients B
and F (and thus in H and I ) and in the steady-state equilibrium values of Var(b),
Var(c), and Cov(c, b′). This results in a very complex equation relating the IC with
the aspiration intensity δ. However, it can be proved that the marginal introduction of
aspirations ends up reducing the value of IC so that the degree of mobility in wealth
increases. The intuition behind this result lies in the fact that the marginal utility of
adult consumption increases when aspirations are introduced and, thus, workers tend
to increase their consumption by reducing both their saving and the amount of bequests
they leave to their children. Obviously, this results in a smaller correlation between
the assets of parents and their direct descendants.
One interesting by-product of this model is that the presence of warm-glow altruism
gives raise to a positive amount of bequests and, hence, it opens the door to positive per-
sistence in asset holdings within a dynasty. If there were no bequests in our economy,
which occurs when the bequest motive is ρ = 0, the intergenerational correlation IC
of asset holdings would be negative. Obviously, when aspirations are present in an
economy with no altruism, adult individuals seek to mimic the consumption level of
their parents and, since labor income is uncorrelated across generations, the savings
of two consecutive members of the same family would become negatively correlated.
6 On the possibility of reversals of fortune and the Carnegie conjecture
I have already mentioned in the previous section that the presence of aspirations might
be a source of deterministic endogenous cycles in asset holdings across successive gen-
erations of a given dynasty. This means that the economic system has inherent forces
that make individual wealth to fluctuate so that rich parents are followed by poor sons
and vice versa. These wealth oscillations take thus the form of endogenous reversals
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of fortune, which are just driven by the intergenerational transmission of tastes about
consumption. In this economic environment the supply of efficiency units of labor is
assumed to be exogenous and, thus, it plays no role for the emergence of cycles.
The possibility of the aforementioned reversals of fortune and, therefore, of deter-
ministic intergenerational mobility has been analyzed by several authors through the
lenses of the so called ”Carnegie conjecture” according to which “the parent who
leaves his son enormous wealth generally deadens the talents and energies of the son,
and tempts him to live a less useful and less worthy life than he otherwise would …”
(Carnegie 1962). There is some empirical evidence about the negative relationship
between the amount of inheritance individuals receive and their labor supply. The
reduction in the labor supply brought about by large bequests could take the form of
a reduction in the number of hours worked, an early retirement decision, or direct job
quitting (see Brown et al. 2010; Cox 2014; Elinder et al. 2012; Erlend et al. 2012;
Holtz-Eakin et al. 1993; Joulfaian and Wilhelm 1994, 2006). This reduction in the
effort put in production activities typically results in a reduction in the amount of
wealth transmitted to the next generation.
Degan and Thibault (2016) have modeled explicitly the Carnegie conjecture in a
non-stochasticmodelwhere the amount of effort (and thus of labor income) depends on
the endogenous amount of inheritance individuals receive. Rich individuals have less
incentives to exert effort since the increase in marginal utility arising from higher labor
income for the rich individuals is lower than for the poor. Under some assumptions
about the parameter values concerning the bequest motive and the cost of effort, these
authors generate patterns of dynastic accumulation ofwealth displaying a deterministic
strong mobility in family wealth. This strong mobility agrees with the studies reported
by Cochell and Zeeb (2005), according to which six out of ten very rich families lose
the family fortune by the end of the second generation and nine out of ten will loose
it by the end of the third generation.
The models of Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) and Gradstein (2008) assume instead
that parents shape the preferences of their children concerning the effort they devote
to their work. Doepke and Zilibotti assume that the members of middle-class and
poor families develop patience and a work ethic, which are the attitudes that bet-
ter fit in their occupations, while the members of upper class families, who rely on
large capital income, invest instead in the appreciation of leisure. Gradstein (2008)
proposes an alternative mechanism of intergenerational transmission of preferences
in which poor parents have incentives to provide their children with working habits
to minimize children dependence on parental transfers. These two mechanisms of
endogenous transmission of preferences give raise to strong fluctuations of wealth
across generations and, thus, to reversals of fortune within a family.
Alonso-Carrera et al. (2016) propose amodification of the previousmodel byDegan
and Thibault to explain simultaneously the reversals of fortune and the intergenera-
tional persistence of education levels within families. This persistence of education
attainment has been empirically documented by Hertz et al. (2008) and Behrman et al.
(2001), who found a high correlation between years of schooling between fathers
and their children in countries where the credit constraints to finance education are
binding, as it occurs in many South American countries. However, Nordic countries
display lower estimates of intergenerational education correlations (Chevalier et al.
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2009 and Hertz et al. 2008), which could be explained by the existence of a welfare
state providing public education so that borrowing constraints become less relevant for
human capital investment. The mechanism proposed by Alonso et al. is again based on
the interaction between effort and wealth suggested by the Carnegie conjecture. They
assume that individuals finance their own education when young using the wealth they
have inherited from their parents and that exerting effort has a cost in terms of utility.
They assume again that there is a minimum indivisible cost μ for acquiring education
and that individuals cannot borrow to finance their education. Moreover, they assume
that the wage compensation is an increasing function of both human capital (or skill)
and effort made by workers. Finally, human capital and labor effort are assumed to be
strong complements in the determination of wages. In other words, the return in terms
of labor earning from effort is higher for the educated (or skilled) individuals than for
the unskilled.
Under some assumptions about the wage as a function of skill and effort together
with a restriction on the value μ of the education cost, it can be proved that only the
individuals that have skilled parents can afford the indivisible cost of education since
they are the ones who receive a sufficiently large inheritance to be spent in human
capital acquisition. Moreover, the Carnegie conjecture applies both within the class of
skilled families and within the class of unskilled families so that generations exerting
effort are followed by generations that do not exert it. When an individual receives a
large inheritance he exerts small effort so that the wealth of the family decreases. Since
the next generation receives a small inheritance, their members make more effort and
the wealth of the family increases again. Note that the amount of bequest left by a
parent plays a triple role as it determines the initial wealth of his children, the skill
level they will acquire through schooling, and the amount of effort they will exert.
Finally, both effort and skill will determine in turn the initial amount of wealth of the
next generation within the dynasty.
The previous mechanism generates a rich social class structure with four socioeco-
nomic classes in the long-run: (1) A poor class composed of unskilled individuals who
do not make effort; (2) a rich class composed of skilled individuals who exert effort;
(3) a middle class composed of unskilled individuals who make effort; and (4) another
middle class composed of skilled individuals who do not exert effort. Moreover, there
is large mobility among classes in the long-run equilibrium as the economy displays
both upward and downward mobility between the two classes of unskilled individuals
and between the two classes of skilled individuals.
The long-run transition matrix among the four socioeconomic classes of the econ-
omy has the following structure, which generates two simultaneous deterministic
cycles for both skilled and unskilled dynasties:
Father Son
R-S P-S R-U P-U
Rich-Skilled 0 1 0 0
Poor-Skilled 1 0 0 0
Rich-Unskilled 1 0 0 1
Poor-Unskilled 0 0 1 0
Transition matrix displaying two cycles
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Fig. 7 Cycles in the amount of bequest for skilled and unskilled families. (Source: Alonso-Carrera et al.
2016)
Figure 7 depicts the resulting equilibrium in the long-run. In this equilibrium, the
educated families are in a cycle where generations that exert no effort and leave an
amount of bequest equal to b4 alternate with generations that make effort and leave a
bequest equal b3.The non-educated dynasties are also in a cyclewhere generations that
do not exert effort and leave an amount of bequest equal to b2 alternatewith generations
that make effort and leave a bequest equal to b1.Note that the valueμ of the education
cost is such that the skilled dynasties remain skilled forever and the same occurs for
the unskilled dynasties. Therefore, the model gives raise to mobility in wealth levels
but high persistence in education attainment across generations. Moreover, the model
displays the realistic feature that unskilled individuals get uniformly smaller bequests
than skilled individuals.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the existence of the rich social class structure
and the corresponding dynastic dynamics I have just described relies on particular
exogenous values of the wage for different combinations of effort and skill and of the
education cost. Therefore, changes in technology may induce variations in both the
skill premium and the effort premium, which result in dramatic changes in the social
structure. Similarly, changes in public policy may also make some social classes dis-
appear. For instance, let us consider a reform in the welfare state so that the indivisible
cost μ of education faced by individuals experiences a sizeable reduction. Figure 8
shows the situation emerging after this non-marginal policy change. The cycle involv-
ing educated individuals disappears and, hence, all the educated individuals end up
not making effort. This is so because to exert effort is no longer necessary to preserve
the skill level across individuals belonging to the same dynasty. Moreover, the size
of the population that becomes educated increases since now the education becomes
more affordable.
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Fig. 8 Equilibria after a large reduction in the cost μ of education. (Source: Alonso-Carrera et al. 2016)
7 Final remarks
In this paper I have reviewed some measures of intergenerational mobility used
in empirical economics and discussed some of the mechanisms explaining per-
sistence of economic variables among the members of the same family across
generations. I have put special emphasis on the role of aspirations in shaping
the preferences of the members of a family and in the role of borrowing con-
straints in limiting the access to education. These two factors typically result
in a smaller degree of intergenerational mobility. I have also tried to shed
some light on the factors that could give raise to reversals of fortune within a
family.
Since borrowing constraints result in the inability of families to make an optimal
investment in education, I have analyzed the effects on intergenerational mobility of
popular policy measures that are supposedly aimed at alleviating these constraints,
like education subsidies or inheritance taxes. In this respect, I should stress that I have
not delved into the normative consequences of the lack of intergenerational mobil-
ity and, therefore, I have not discussed either the welfare implications of specific
public policies. A proper welfare analysis of the issues discussed in this paper will
require the use of the appropriate social welfare measure for an economy populated
with potentially altruistic individuals belonging to different generations. Moreover,
I have not explored either the growth implications of an increase in the degree of
intergenerational mobility arising from a better allocation of investments in edu-
cation. However, I would like to emphasize the importance of these topics that I
have left outside the focus of the paper since, at the end, the analysis of the fac-
tors that prevent intergenerational mobility and of the policies that enhance it is
crucial for the promotion of societies where both equal opportunity and efficiency
prevail.
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